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NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-AMENDED PETITION-RIGHTS OF
ACTION-SUBROGATION
A boiler exploded in Younger's motel causing $33,415 dam-
age. Younger collected in full from his insurer, Springfield, con-
ventionally subrogating the company to all his claims, rights,
and interest. Four months later Younger filed suit against the
boiler manufacturer, the installer, and the servicer. No mention
was made of the subrogation. Four and one-half years later,
while the suit was still pending, Springfield, the insurer-
subrogee, sought to file a supplemental and amended petition
to add itself as a party plaintiff.' Held, the filing of the supple-
mental and amended petition was disallowed as improper join-
der; plaintiff's suit was dismissed for no right of action.
Younger v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 193
So.2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), writs denied, 195 So.2d 644
(1967).
Prescription appears to be the real, underlying issue. Be-
cause the Code provides a one-year prescriptive period for
tort actions 2 and because four and one-half years had passed
since the explosion, Springfield sought to avail itself of the
timely filed suit by Younger. Had there been no prescriptive
problem, Springfield could have instituted suit independently
and would not have appealed the decision of the lower court.
But prescription was not pleaded and could not be considered
by the court.3
The court relied on Code of Civil Procedure article 697,
which provides that the subrogee in a total subrogation shall
be the proper party to judicially enforce the cause of action.4
1. The transcript indicates that it was the plaintiff himself who sought
to amend and supplement his own petition to add Springfield as a party
plaintiff. This is procedurally more correct, as the articles of the Code of
Civil Procedure give no indication that third parties may amend petitions
of the original party plaintiffs. Contrarily, the Code in article 1091 provides
for intervention by third parties in a pending action to enforce a related
right. The dissent is in error in designating Springfield as an intervenor. No
such conclusion is evidenced by the briefs or the transcript.
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536 (1870).
3. Id. art. 3463; LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 927 (1960).
4. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 697 (1960): "An incorporeal right to
which a person has been subrogated, either conventionally or by effect of
law, shall be enforced judicially by: (1) The subrogor and the subrogee,
when the subrogation is partial; or (2) The subrogee, when the entire right
is subrogated."
[479]
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The Reporter's Comment on the article is ambiguous-"If there
has been a total subrogation and the suit is brought in the
name of the subrogor, the latter has no right of action, and
the court cannot adjudicate in the absence of the indispensable
party plaintiff-the subrogee." The majority read the sentence
with emphasis on the first independent clause-the subrogor
has no right of action. Thus, just as Younger could not have
been joined in a suit filed by Springfield,5 neither could Spring-
field be joined in a suit which Younger had instituted. In either
instance there would be improper joinder of parties.
The dissent stressed the Reporter's suggestion that the sub-
rogee is an indispensable party. As such no adjudication of
the controversy would be possible without his joinder. Stressing
that the rules of procedure are adjective to the enforcement of
substantive law, the dissent reasoned that the subrogee, having
a right to recover damages from the tortfeasor, should not be
prevented from doing so by mere procedural law.
In deciding the case, both the majority and dissent focused
on the problem of party interest. It is suggested that perhaps
more direct consideration ought to have been given the basic
issue of the real focal point raised by the pleadings-whether
to permit amendment. Recognizing that procedure is a means of
implementing substantive law,O the Code of Civil Procedure has
adopted a liberal attitude toward amendments7 which do not
adversely prejudice the rights of parties involved. The conten-
tion may be made that if the amendment is permitted, the
defendant will be prejudiced by the loss of his defense of pre-
scription, which is just as much a part of the substantive law
as the obligation of a tortfeasor to pay the injured party. How-
ever, it is apparent that the policy considerations underlying
the rules of prescription are not defeated by allowing the amend-
ment. These policy considerations are the prevention of prosecu-
5. Id. art. 926(7).
6. Id. art. 5051: "The articles of this Code are to be construed liberally,
and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the
substantive law and are not an end in themselves."; Id. comment: "This
article expresses the procedural philosophy of this Code and serves as a
constant reminder to the bench and bar that procedural rules are only a
means to an end, and not an end in themselves."
7. Id. art. 854, comment b: " . . . liberality of amendment [is) provided
by Art. 1154, infra . . . "; Id. arts. 1153, 1154, 1155; Douglas v. Haro, 214 La.
1099, 39 So.2d 744 (1949); Reeves v. Globe Indem. Co. of New York, 185 La.
42, 168 So. 488 (1936).
tion of stale claims8 and the psychological and economic security
for the wrongdoer.9 Here Younger filed suit within the pre-
scriptive period, and this served to notify the defendant of the
claim against him. Therefore, the defendant was on notice to
preserve evidence for the pending litigation. Since he already
had notice of suit, it should have made no difference to him
whether he paid Younger or Springfield. Injustice had not been
done to the rules of prescription, for the spirit had been complied
with. For these reasons-a liberal attitude toward amendments,
effectuation of the substantive law, and an absence of real
prejudice to the defendant-the amendment should have been
permitted. By express provision of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, 10 the amendment would relate back to the date of filing
of the original pleading, since it arose out of the occurrence
set forth in the original pleading.
The trend today in other jurisdictions is to permit party
amendments after the statute of limitations has run against the
party with the right of action." These courts conclude that
permitting such amendments does not conflict with the previ-
ously mentioned policies underlying statutes of limitations.
"[T]he new plaintiff today is usually allowed to take advan-
tage of the former action if the original plaintiff had in any
capacity, either before or after the commencement of suit, an
interest in the subject matter of the controversy."' 2
In applying this philosophy to the problem in Younger, a
technical problem is created. By allowing a party amendment
to a suit instituted by one without any actual interest, the
doors may be opened to suits by intermeddlers. The courts,
however, should simply distinguish such suits on their facts.
Here Younger had, before subrogation, an actual interest in the
controversy that would have supported this suit. There still exists
at least a real connection between Younger and the defendant.'3
8. United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. La. 1950), affirmed,
190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 174 (1965).
9. Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 14 So.2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1943); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 174 (1965).
10. LA. CODE OF CIVI. PROCEDURE art. 1153 (1960): "When the action or
defense asserted in the amended petition or answer arises out of the con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of filing the
original pleading."
11. Comment, 63 -ARv. L. REV. 1177, 1239 (1950).
12. Id.
13. Support for such a distinction exists In Douglas v. Haro, 214 La.
1099, 39 So.2d 744 (1949), where the court fictitiously created an interest in
a bailee of an automobile.
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Intermeddlers would have no such connection or arguable
interest.
Interestingly, had Springfield remained silent, the subroga-
tion would not have been before the court, and the plaintiff
might have been successful in his action to recover damages.
Springfield then could have recovered the money from the plain-
tiff, who would hold it only as constructive trustee.14
If this decision is followed, total subrogees, as the proper
parties to sue, will not be able to take advantage of suits filed
by the subrogor by adding themselves as party plaintiffs through
amendment. The court has given the words of the Code a literal
interpretation and has thereby prevented the subrogor's suit
from having any effect.
Sidney M. Blitzer, Jr.
CONFLICT OF LAws-RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
DIVORCE DECREES
Wife sued to have a certain immovable declared her sepa-
rate property. Prior to its purchase both wife and defendant-
husband had gone to Mexico and within three days secured
divorces from their respective spouses and married each other.
The parties returned to Louisiana to live, later secured Louisiana
divorces from their "former" spouses and were married in a
Louisiana ceremony. The property in question, however, was
purchased prior to the Louisiana ceremony. Held, the immov-
able was the wife's separate property. The Mexican divorces and
marriage were invalid, therefore no community of acquets and
gains existed between the parties at the time of the purchase.
Although the court was unable to locate a single pertinent Lou-
isiana case, it reasoned that since Louisiana courts are not
required by the full faith and credit clause to recognize divorces
granted in foreign countries it follows, a fortiori, that such
divorces, which do not meet the standards required for recogni-
tion of divorces granted by sister states, need not be recognized.
Under the full faith and credit clause a divorce granted in a
sister state is entitled to recognition only when one of the
parties is domiciled there. Neither the parties nor their spouses
14. Moncrieff v. Lacobie, 89 So.2d 471, 474-75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
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